Livelihood decisions under the shadow of conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh by Badiuzzaman, M. et al.
 
 
 
Copyright  ©  UNU-WIDER 2013 
 
*Muhammad Badiuzzaman, Research Consultant, Human Development Research Centre 
(HDRC), Dhaka, Bangladesh, corresponding author, bzaman04@gmail.com. John Cameron, 
International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Hague, the 
Netherlands. Syed Mansoob Murshed, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) and 
Coventry University, UK.  
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on 'New Approaches to 
Measuring Poverty and Vulnerability', directed by Jukka Pirttilä and Markus Jäntti. 
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions to the research programme 
from the governments of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
ISSN 1798-7237 ISBN 978-92-9230-583-3
 
WIDER Working Paper No. 2013/006 
 
 
Livelihood decisions under the shadow of conflict in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh 
 
  
Muhammad Badiuzzaman, John Cameron, and  
Syed Mansoob Murshed*  
 
 
January 2013 
Abstract 
We analyse rural household livelihood and children’s school enrolment decisions in a post-
conflict setting in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region of Bangladesh. The innovation of the 
paper lies in the fact that we employ information about current subjective perceptions 
regarding the possibility of violence in the future and past actual experiences of violence to 
explain household economic decision-making. Preferences are endogenous in line with 
behavioural economics. Regression results show that heightened subjective perceptions of 
future violence and past actual experiences of conflict influences current consumption 
increases child enrolment, and encourages risky mixed crop cultivation. The trauma 
emanating from past experiences combined with current high perceptions of risk of violence 
may induce bolder and riskier behaviour in line with prospect theories of risk. Furthermore, a,  
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post-conflict household-level Phoenix or economic revival factor may be in operation, based 
in part on greater within group trust.  
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1 Introduction 
The object of this paper is to analyse rural household livelihood decisions, including 
educational investment for future generations, in a post-conflict setting located in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region of Bangladesh. This is a region in the South-Eastern 
part of the country where a low level insurgency took place between 1976 and 1997, 
officially terminating after a peace accord in December 1997.1 The armed struggle was 
between the state’s security forces, mainly the Bangladesh army, and the ethnically distinct 
local population, in an otherwise fairly homogenous nation in terms of language and religion. 
The insurgency aimed at regional autonomy rather than independence, but the principal local 
grievance was against officially sponsored land encroachment and grabbing by outsiders who 
pose a threat not only to local livelihoods, but potentially also to a distinct local way of life; 
see Chakma (2006) and Roy (2000). All of this took place in the land-hungry context of the 
world’s most densely populated country, which is also a low-income developing country 
where agriculture continues to be the main source of the population’s livelihood. Thus, neo-
Malthusian factors may be at work. Population growth adds to land scarcity, exacerbated by 
environmental degradation, fuelling conflict over land and environmental resources (Homer-
Dixon 1999).  
There is now a substantial literature on the causes of large-scale internal conflict in the 
rational choice tradition. These explanations have tended to centre on either the grievance 
hypothesis (mainly linked to inequalities between distinct groups delineated by ethnicity, 
religion, or some other marker), or the greed motivation (reflecting the competition over 
capturable rents); see Murshed (2010, chapter 3) for a review. A great deal of empirical work 
has also been conducted to test the empirical validity of these allegedly competing theories. 
The results are inconclusive, mainly due to data paucity on inter-group inequality (also 
known as horizontal inequality).  
But the important point is that many of the quantitative studies on civil war are cross-country 
in nature, where the experiences of civil war in different and far-flung countries are lumped 
together in one single statistical (econometric) exercise. One can, therefore, be sceptical 
about the results of such regression analyses, as the various populations under scrutiny are 
not necessarily drawn from a homogenous population. Quite apart from this conceptual 
objection to cross-country quantitative analyses, there is also a need to conduct more 
systematic quantitative studies of the drivers and consequences of conflict at a more local 
level within nation states, a research area that is still relatively neglected.  
Armed conflict may have far reaching consequences for rural livelihood strategies, including 
investment decisions and cropping patterns. This may contribute to analysis of poverty, as 
well as development in general, particularly rural development. Lacunae associated with 
localized conflict become even more acute when it comes to the economic analyses of the 
short and long term impacts of conflict on households’ decision-making. The first innovation 
of the paper is that it is able to make a contribution in this connection, based on a unique data 
set compiled during a socio-economic survey of households resident in this area in 2007 
(Barkat et al. 2009).  
                                                
1 The conflict in the CHT of Bangladesh is coded as a minor armed conflict, according to PRIO-Uppsala 
methodology; see http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Conflicts-Version-
X-2009/ (accessed on 5 November  2010). 
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The rural farming household is no stranger to risky outlays, as returns to cropping or animal 
husbandry are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties. We will utilize the livelihood 
framework to explain household decisions under uncertainty. This approach acknowledges an 
inherent inseparability between production and consumption decisions for rural households 
(Bardhan and Udry 1999, chapter 2) which affects labour allocation between farm and off-
farm (including education) activities, as well as cropping (and animal husbandry activities) 
for own consumption and the market.     
The nature of these risks and uncertainties can be altered by armed conflict of a sufficiently 
long duration. This affects the livelihood and investment decisions of households. We will  
relate our findings to prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) to explain greater risk-
taking behaviour following the traumas of war, where a strong desire to retrieve a valued past 
state may help explain increased risk-taking. This is the second innovation of the paper. 
Additionally, the survey employed in the paper contains information about subjective 
perceptions regarding the future prospects of violence after the conflict has ended, as well as 
past actual experiences of violence, which both impact on household economic decision-
making. Thus we are dealing with preferences that are endogenous, not only to economic, 
political, and social institutions (Bowles 1998; Fehr and Hoff 2011), but also to personal 
histories of trauma and expectations of future conflict. Along with standard socioeconomic 
characteristics our household survey data contains both subjective (psychological) 
information regarding trust, current perceptions about the risk of future conflict, and objective 
data on past conflict experience. We relate these to observed livelihood decision-making. 
This is in line with contemporary behavioural economics, as well as earlier thinking by 
Boulding (1956) about individual self-image and the effect of various stimuli in framing 
one’s image.  
Our analysis is conducted in the post-accord era, a decade after a peace treaty which allegedly 
ended the war. As is well known, peace treaties across the developing world rarely coincide 
with the total cessation of violence, and the fear that conflict will reignite pervades many 
post-conflict societies. Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2008), in their cross-country study, 
point out that civil war is likely to resume within a decade in a typical developing country. 
Another important policy issue in post-conflict environments is the resumption of economic 
activity and growth. On the one hand, post-conflict growth can be lopsided, favouring 
infrastructure reconstruction over agriculture or manufacturing due to war time collateral 
damage, as well as the perceived riskiness of investment in productive sectors which take a 
long time to yield dividends (Addison and Murshed 2005). On the other hand, other authors 
emphasize a more general ‘Phoenix’ factor (Koubi 2005). In other words, rapid economic 
growth (in the aggregate macroeconomic sense) follows intense and prolonged hostilities. 
There can, however, be differences across various economic sectors. Our third innovation is 
that we examine whether there can be such a local Phoenix factor given the impact of 
subjective perceptions on household cropping decisions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief sketch of the context 
of the conflict, section 3 outlines a description of the data and methodology, section 4 
presents our statistical (econometric) results, and section 5 is by way of conclusion.  
2  The Chittagong Hill Tracts region of Bangladesh 
Bangladesh is in the Ganges delta and is one of the most densely (1,229/sq.km) populated 
countries in the world where the amount of per capita arable land was only 0.1 hectares in 
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2007. It is a low-income developing country, where about 50 per cent of the population lives 
in poverty (using the international poverty line of below US$1.25 per day; World Bank 
2010). Over last two decades, Bangladesh’s economy experienced growth rates of around 5.5 
per cent per annum, but a large part of GDP and employment still relates to traditional 
agriculture (World Development Indicators). This makes land the scarcest and most 
competed over resource in Bangladesh. Land grabbing is a common phenomenon in 
Bangladesh, and illegal practices and political patronage are often associated with land 
holding (Barkat and Roy 2008).  
Bangladesh is mostly ethnically homogenous, with the vast majority of the population being 
Bengali speaking and Muslim. There are a few distinct ethnicities that differ in both language 
and religion. These groups are mainly concentrated in the CHT region. This region is situated 
in the southeastern part of the country, and is covered with lush green hills, with a relatively 
larger proportion of afforested areas. From a strategic point of view CHT is important as it 
adjoins two Indian states (Tripura and Mizoram), and also Myanmar or Burma. Insurgency in 
the Indian north-eastern states and Myanmar raises the military importance of this region 
(Roy 2000; Barkat et al. 2009; Mohsin 2003). The various ethnic groups in CHT are closer, 
in appearance and culture, to their neighbours in north-eastern India, Myanmar, and Thailand, 
than to the rest of Bangladesh. Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity are prevalent among 
these ethnicities. They have their own languages in both oral and written form. The 
indigenous peoples of CHT are often identified as Jumma people, derived from the word jum 
(swidden or slash and burn shifting cultivation). The proportion of the non-indigenous 
(Bengali speaking) population in CHT has been increasing over time. According to the 1991 
population census of Bangladesh, indigenous groups constitute 51.4 per cent of the CHT total 
population of about one million (Mohsin 2003; Roy 2000). It is important to note that the 
indigenous inhabitants of CHT also exhibit a degree of diversity based on eleven different 
(tribal) identities. 
Despite its lower population density compared to the rest of Bangladesh, the CHT region is 
actually land-scarce in terms of availability of land for cultivation (only 23 per cent of the 
land is arable). In 1974 the amount of per capita arable land was about 0.45 hectares, which 
declined to about 0.24 hectares in 1991.  Most of the land is either non-inhabitable due to its 
topography, or its usage is restricted by law (reserve or protected forests). The land 
ownership patterns, as well as types of land in CHT, also differ from that of plain regions. 
Customary (common) ownership of land exists here, and at the same time private property 
rights are also recognized by the State, making ownership issues more complex (Roy 2000; 
Barkat et al. 2009).  
The CHT region enjoyed an autonomous status until 1860 when the British took it over under 
their direct administration. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation of 1900 put an embargo on 
'outsiders' settling or purchasing land in the territory. This 'excluded area' status of CHT was 
replaced by a 'tribal area' classification in 1962. Due to the construction of an artificial 
reservoir by damming the river Karnafuli at Kaptai in the 1960s for the purposes of power 
generation, approximately 1,036 square kilometres were submerged, and 54,000 acres of 
highly prized arable land was lost in the river valleys.  
 
Successive Bangladeshi governments of both a military and democratic complexion adopted 
mixed strategies of using military force to quell rebellion and protest, while at the same time 
encouraging, or colluding with, a population transfer programme. In 1976 armed forces were 
also deployed in CHT in a classic ‘Aid to Civil Power’ operation, which triggered tensions in 
the region. A few indigenous political groups (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhiti Samiti or 
PCJSS) engaged in armed struggle against the intrusion by the authorities. Under the counter-
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insurgency strategy, demographic engineering interventions aimed at settling a large number 
of Bengali speaking households in CHT were seen as enhancing the size of population loyal 
to the state, and these fresh settlements acted as a counterweight to indigenous peoples’ 
demands for rights and regional autonomy. Due to the state sponsored settlement programme, 
a considerable number of indigenous people were uprooted from their homesteads, something 
which helped to intensify the armed struggle. About 54,000 indigenous people took refuge in 
the neighbouring Tripura state of India, and another 50,000 indigenous people became 
internally displaced persons.  
In the post-cold war era, and after the restoration of democracy in Bangladesh, pressure for a 
political solution mounted. This led to an accord between the Parbotto Chattragram Jana 
Samhiti Samiti (PCJSS) and the Government of Bangladesh on December 02, 1997, known 
as ‘The Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord 1997’. The Accord was incomplete; the ‘United 
Peoples Democratic Front (UPDF)’ continues the struggle for full autonomy (Mohsin 2003).  
Continuing land disputes, the non-restitution of land to indigenous peoples, the presence of 
the Bangladesh army, the poor rehabilitation of refugees and internally displaced persons 
along with the non-implementation of a special status in the country’s constitution make the 
post-conflict situation of CHT fragile. Indigenous people living in this area continue 
experiencing various types of violence and face restrictions on their mobility (Barkat et al. 
2009).  
3 Data and Methodology 
The ‘Socio-economic Baseline Survey of Chittagong Hill Tracts’ is the source of our 
quantitative data; see Barkat et al. (2009). This survey was commissioned in 2007 and the 
data was collected in 2008 from a cross section of households (both migrant Bengalis and 
indigenous people) living in CHT. The study aimed at generating benchmark information to 
be subsequently used to track periodic progress attained through interventions by the 
CHTDF-UNDP.  
The sample design of the survey captured the whole region of CHT, and especially the ethnic 
diversity among the indigenous population. The representative sample comprised 3,238 
households, where the number of indigenous and migrant Bengali households was 1,786 and 
1,452 respectively. The sampling procedure carefully considered the geographical and ethnic 
diversity of CHT and its population. Although the main focus of the survey was collecting 
data on the socio-economic status of the CHT population, it also gathered data on peace 
confidence-building issues. The measurable broader categories of variables are demographic, 
economic, social (education and health), cultural, infrastructure facilities, and peace-
confidence-building data. In particular, what is noteworthy is that data on current post 
conflict subjective perceptions about the degree of violence, and the chance of its occurring 
in future, was collected from households for the year 2008. These pertain to their threat 
perceptions about the extent of armed conflict, the possibility of attacks from the other 
community and the fear of forcible eviction, as well as other variables at the time of the 
survey. Observe that these variables amount to expectations about the future prospects of 
conflict. In addition, household’s actual experience of violence, or their participation in 
conflict, during the years of the insurgency (1976-97) was also collected related to 
displacement or eviction, loss of land and armed conflict among others. These refer to past 
experiences of violence. Not surprisingly there are missing observations, both on the 
perceptual as well as the actual past experiences of conflict, as not all households felt able to 
reveal this sensitive information, not least because of the continued presence of the 
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Bangladesh army in this area. Furthermore, we have data on the degree of trust (social 
capital), particularly among the various tribes that make up the indigenous population of 
CHT. Dataset also contains child specific information within the households.     
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Demographic and socio-economic characteristics of households 
People living in the CHT are relatively poorer than the rest of Bangladesh, and the average 
household size at 5.2 persons is larger than the Bangladeshi average of 4.8. There is a greater 
prevalence of female-headed households (36 per cent) in this region compared to 10.3 per 
cent for Bangladesh as a whole (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2007). According to lower 
poverty line of the cost of basic needs (CBN) method, 74 per cent households are poor, while 
85 per cent of households are poor according to CBN upper poverty line. More than half of 
the enrolled children (55 per cent) were going to community managed or Islamic religious 
school.  A total of 31 per cent of enrolled children were going to a government school, and a 
very small proportion was found going to private and NGO schools. Most households (55 per 
cent) used the jum (slash and burn) method of agriculture, 31 per cent employed the plough, 
with 14 per cent using both techniques; see Table 1. 
Perceptions and actual experience of violence  
Perceptual data on the threat of violence pertains to the year of the survey (2008). This allows 
the researcher to analyse the nexus between perceptions of violence and various livelihood 
decisions in a post conflict setting. In Table 2 perceptions about the threat of violence relate 
to three variables: (i) perceptions about armed conflict, (ii) perceptions about communal 
violence occurring and (iii) the fear of eviction. In the survey, 15 per cent households 
perceived a threat of armed conflict, while about a third felt a danger of communal violence, 
and 36 per cent of households were apprehensive about possible eviction from their land.  
Additionally, some 92 per cent of indigenous households felt that their group relations were 
good, implying the presence of trust within and between the eleven different tribes which 
comprise that community. It has to be borne in mind that the indigenous peoples’ antagonists 
(settler Bengalis) are ethnically very homogenous and we would expect a high level of trust 
within that group. Only about 12 per cent of the responses elicited to good relations between 
the settler and indigenous communities. Data on real life experiences of conflict for the 
period of the insurgency (1976-97) were collected from households (with at least one family 
member experiencing violence) chiefly in the form of three broad categories: (i) displacement 
from  home, (ii) dispossession of land (either farmland or homestead) and (iii) participation in 
and/or victim of armed conflict; see Table 2. Estimates indicate that 13 per cent of the 
households experienced displacement from their own home or land and 18 per cent were 
dispossessed of their farm land before the peace accord in 1997. All in all, various types of 
armed conflict were experienced by 18 per cent of the households. 
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Table 1: Key demographic and socio-economic characteristics of households  
Variables Mean Standard  
Deviation 
Number of 
Observation 
Demographic and related 
Household size 5.22 1.9868 5023 
Mean age of household head (in years) 39.16 13.5469 3234 
Sex of household head (male=1) 0.64 0.4812 3234 
HH head never attended school 0.54 0.4986 3234 
HH head completed primary school 0.25 0.4329 3234 
HH head completed secondary school 0.20 0.4008 3234 
HH head completed above secondary 0.01 0.1049 3234 
Age of child (in year) 7.21 4.8210 3970 
Age square of child 75.30 84.950 3970 
Sex of child (male=1) 0.63 0.4819 3970 
Ethnicity of household (indigenous=1) 0.59 0.4925 5023 
Socio-economic and related 
Amount of land cultivated (decimal) 232.71 333.46 3265 
Per capita amount of land cultivated 
(decimal) 
52.95 84.77 3265 
Per capita asset (in Tk.) 10,846 22790 5023 
Poverty status (CBN Lower poverty line) 0.74 0.4393 5023 
Socio-economic and related 
Poverty status (CBN upper poverty line) 0.85 0.3488 5023 
HH electrification 0.17 0.3755 3238 
Type of school studied 
 government school  0.31 0.4622 3970 
 private school 0.11 0.3164 3970 
 NGO school 0.03 0.1574 3970 
 other type of school 0.55 0.4973 3970 
Language of book (mother tongue) 0.20 0.4008 3238 
Medium of instruction (mother tongue) 0.20 0.4026 3238 
Type of cultivation 
Plough cultivation 0.31 0.4623 5023 
Jum cultivation 0.55 0.5505 5023 
Both jum and plough cultivation 0.14 0.3469 5023 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
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Table2: Household status on perception and experience of violence 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Number of Observation 
Current perception of violence 
Fear of armed conflict  0.16 0.3629 1840 
Fear of communal violence  0.33 0.3278 1839 
Fear of eviction from land  0.38 0.4859 1881 
Previous experience of violence  
Displacement 0.13 0.3363 5023 
 Land dispossession 0.18 0.3891 5023 
 Armed conflict 0.18 0.3871 5023 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
 
Livelihood decision-making variables 
Three household livelihood decisions: consumption expenditure, decisions with regard to 
children’s schooling, and production (cropping) decisions are analysed. Data on consumption 
incorporated a separate format for food and non-food expenditure. The average per capita 
annual cash-equivalent consumption expenditure for a household was Tk. 11,867, with Tk. 
11,110 and Tk.757.40 for food and non-food consumption respectively (Table 3).  
We consider the decision to enrol children in school as an investment (human capital 
accumulating) decision. Data on total number of children enrolled in both primary and 
secondary school were analysed at the household level, within the age brackets 6-18 years. 
Estimates show that 44 per cent children of the CHT were enrolled in schools.   
We consider ‘Type of Crop Produced’ as the proxy for production decisions. Data on types of 
cropping were categorized into food crops, cash crops, and mixed crops (both food and cash 
crop). Some 42 per cent of households produce only food crops, which is consistent with the 
socio-economic and cultural history of the CHT. Though an insignificantly small proportion 
of households produced only cash crops, there were a good number of households (52 per 
cent) producing both cash and food crops (annex Table 1). 
3.2 Empirical model specification and strategy 
Our quantitative analysis primarily focuses on the relation between either the perceived threat 
of violence after the peace accord, or the past experience of conflict before the peace treaty, 
on various livelihood decision-making by households living in the CHT. Our sample from the 
survey data set considers the population as a whole; both indigenous and migrant Bengali. 
The summary of specifications for household livelihood decision-making represented by 
consumption, investment and production decisions are shown in annex Table 2. For 
consumption decisions an OLS model was used. But for investment in children’s education 
and production (cropping) decisions a Logit or Probit model was specified, as these two cases 
measure the probability or chance of an event occurring. We control for household 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics including those for children, type of school, 
facilities at the school, and agricultural techniques.   
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Table 3: Household livelihood status  
Variables  Mean Value Standard 
Deviation 
Number of 
Observation 
Consumption Decision 
Per capita annual consumption expenditure (in Tk.) 11,867 4501.676 5023 
Per capita annual food consumption expenditure (in 11,110 4321.031 5023 
Per capita annual non-food consumption expenditure 757.40 421.1768 5023 
Investment Decision
Child enrolment in primary and secondary school 0.44 0.4962 3970
Production Decision: Type of cropping 
Only food 0.42 0.4931 3265 
Only cash 0.07 0.2491 3265 
Mixed (both food and cash) crop 0.51 0.4998 3265 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
 
The standard regression equation followed in this paper is as follows: 
Yi = α + β1 HSEij + β2Hij + β3 Cij + β4 Sij + β5 ( Vij, PVij, SCij* PVij) + εi 
 
Where the dependent variable, Yi refers to various livelihood decision-making variables, 
consisting of consumption expenditure (continuous variable in logarithmic form), child 
enrolment in either primary and secondary school (dummy variable), and type of crop 
produced (dummy variable) for household i measured in the survey. The explanatory 
variables are as follows: HSEij are household-level demographic and socio-economic 
variables, Cij is a set of child characteristics (age and sex), Hij describes household head 
characteristics (age, sex and education), Sij denotes schooling variables, SCij indicates social 
capital (trust within the indigenous group), Vij stands for threat perceptions at the time of the 
survey, PVij indicates pre-peace accord experiences of violence, and εi is a random error term.  
Moreover, we use interaction variables for experiences of violence along with trust in three 
regression models. Trust (social capital) is not entered as a separate explanatory variable as 
current perceptions of violence approximate the obverse of between group (indigenous versus 
settler) social capital. It is only relevant in the case of trust among the various (eleven) 
indigenous ethnicities, and as a factor in how the impact of previous experiences of violence 
have evolved into present-day decision-making and preferences. Hence, we only use trust as 
an interaction term with past conflict experience.  
To solve potential endogeneity problems in consumption we use 2SLS techniques, and 
instrumental variable (IV) methods for probit regression on cropping. Hausman tests of 
exogeneity and Alternative Hausman tests of exogeneity are employed to investigate the 
existence of endogeneity problems. We only report valid results in the main body of the 
paper; more detailed estimates are to be found in the annexes.    
4 Results and discussions 
This section analyses the determinants of household consumption decisions, followed by two 
other important livelihood decisions, investment in children’s education and cropping 
(production) decisions, in relation to varying degrees of subjective perceptions of the threat of 
violence, within indigenous group trust factors and pre-peace accord experiences of violence. 
We believe this to be a major innovation of our study, because we attempt to gauge the 
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impact of subjective perceptions upon economic decision-making with regard to 
consumption, output (cropping), and investment decisions after an uneasy peace accord that 
only imperfectly ended the conflict. Within the context we are studying, land dispossession is 
a key factor, and the continuing fear of intimidation with a view to further land alienation is 
likely to impact on indigenous households’ decision-making under uncertainty. To this end, 
and to sharpen our focus and analysis, we classify individual indigenous household’s fears of 
future violence into different variables: armed conflict, communal violence, and fear of 
eviction from land.  
4.1 Consumption expenditure 
We endogenize preferences about consumption to conflict experiences and expectations 
about future conflict. According to the OLS estimation under specification 1 (Table 4), 
variables concerning contemporaneous perceptions about violence reigniting in the future: 
armed conflict, communal violence, and fear of eviction from own land have an influence on 
consumption expenditure as a whole and on food and non-food consumption separately. OLS 
estimates show that current perceptions of armed conflict have a negative influence of 10.7 
per cent on overall consumption expenditure which is statistically significant (p<0.01). For 
food and non-food consumption expenditure the same negative influence is 10.4 per cent and 
12.8 per cent respectively, and statistically significant (p<0.01). Fear of communal violence 
does not show a significant influence on overall consumption, while on food and non-food 
consumption it is statistically significant. The perceived threat of communal violence raises 
food consumption by 3.4 per cent (significant at p<0.1), whereas it reduces non-food 
consumption expenditure by 8 per cent (significant at p<0.01). 
On the other hand, fear of eviction from the household’s land positively influences 
consumption expenditure significantly (p<0.05). Households with this perception spend 4.7 
per cent more on consumption compared to those households without this perception. In the 
case of food consumption households perceiving the possibility of eviction spent 4.6 per cent 
more on food consumption and 6.2 per cent on non-food consumption compared to those who 
do not have such a perception, and this result is significant at the 5 per cent confidence level 
(Table 4 ). Results also show that the fear of armed conflict recurring, fear of communal 
attacks, and the fear of eviction from land are jointly significant in determining amount of 
consumption expenditure, food, and non-food expenditure separately as well (significant at 1 
per cent confidence level; annex Table 4).  
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Table 4 : Determinant of consumption expenditure: OLS estimation 
Independent Variable:  Dependent Variable 
All consumption 
expenditure 
Food consumption 
expenditure 
Non-food consumption 
expenditure 
Specification 1: Current perception of violence 
Fear of armed conflict -0.107***  (0.0217) -0.104***  (0.0224) -0.128*** (0.0260) 
Fear of communal violence      0.0260  (0.0200) 0.0343*  (0.0207) -0.0798***  (0.0258) 
Fear of eviction   0.0468**  (0.0209) 0.0458**  (0.0217) 0.0620**  (0.0267) 
Specification 2: Previous experience of violence 
Displacement  -0.0559** (0.0254) -0.0609** (0.0265) 0.0129 (0.0300) 
Land dispossession 0.0007 (0.0177) -0.0047 (0.0184) 0.0635** (0.0258) 
Past armed conflict -0.0394** (0.0178) -0.0313* (0.0184) -0.133*** (0.0253) 
Specification 3#: Interaction of previous experience of violence and social capital 
Displacement* Trust -0.0195   (0.0714) -0.0280   (0.0734) 0.0227   (0.100) 
Land dispossession* Trust 0.0843 (0.0554) 0.0757  (0.0573) -0.030**  (0.0965) 
Past armed conflict* Trust -0.058**  (0.0590) -0.054**  (0.0600) -0.137  (0.0881) 
Note: Estimation controls for variables; household size, per capita asset, age of household head, sex 
of household head, educational status of household head, household electrification status, enrolment 
of children, and log amount of cultivated land. Social capital is used as control for specification 2 only.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. #To correctly interpret the 
interaction term, we check the joint test of significance for the relevant interaction term with the 
concerned variable and calculate the actual value of the coefficient on the mean value.  
Source: authors’ estimation. 
 
It may be argued that there is an endogeneity issue between current perceptions of violence 
and consumption because households with greater economic capacity may feel more 
threatened. To get consistent coefficient estimates for consumption expenditure regression we 
attempted a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation approach where at the first stage we 
require instrumental variables. There are a few variables in our dataset that are potential 
candidates for instruments. For overall consumption and food consumption regressions we 
used three variables: good relationship between Bengali and indigenous communities, 
perceptions about the oppressiveness of the security forces, and previous land dispossession 
which are uncorrelated with consumption but correlated with our three variable of interest 
under current perceptions of violence. For non-food consumption, we used three variables: 
satisfaction about inter community interaction, attendance in other groups' festivals and 
festivals celebrated jointly which are found to be effective instruments. Results from 2SLS 
estimates found current perception of violence insignificant in determining overall 
consumption expenditure and for food and non-food consumption separately. However, since 
alternative Hausman tests of exogeneity indicate no endogeneity between current perceptions 
of violence and consumption expenditure when we compare OLS and 2SLS estimates (see; 
annex Tables 5-7), we can be confident about the reliability of our OLS estimates on 
consumption.  
 
The regression results under specification 2 show that households with an experience of 
displacement from their home/land before the peace accord spend 5.5 per cent less on 
consumption as a whole and 6 per cent less on food consumption (significant at 5 per cent 
confidence level). Experiences of land dispossession during the conflict period motivate 
households to spend more on non-food consumption (6.3 per cent) and this positive influence 
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is found statistically significant at a 5 per cent confidence level. Households who were in 
armed conflict before the peace accord reduce overall consumption expenditure by 4 per cent 
(significant at 5 per cent confidence level), 3 per cent on food consumption (significant at 10 
per cent confidence level) and 13 per cent on non-food consumption (significant at 1 per cent 
confidence level). Past experiences of violence in the form of displacement, land 
dispossession and armed conflict jointly have significant power (at 1 per cent and 5 per cent 
confidence level) in determining overall consumption, food consumption and non-food 
consumption expenditure (for details see; annex tables 8-9).  
Further we attempted to investigate the role of trust (social capital) in the form of good 
relations among the various indigenous communities on consumption (specification-3, Table 
4). Arguably, trust has an important role on livelihoods in post-conflict settings. Accordingly, 
we interact three variables on previous experiences of violence: displacement, land 
dispossession, and actual experiences of armed conflict with current good relations among 
the indigenous communities (trust) as a proxy of social capital. Specification-3 indicates that 
among the three interaction variables previous experiences of armed conflict along with good 
relations among indigenous communities is statistically significant (p<0.05) for overall 
consumption and food consumption expenditures. Estimates reveal that households who trust 
members of their own community (a perception of good relations within and between various 
indigenous ethnicities) and who previously experienced armed conflict reduce their overall 
consumption by 5.8 per cent and food consumption by 5.5 per cent. This means they are 
saving more, including investment in agriculture. Similarly, non-food consumption 
expenditure falls by 3 per cent when households perceive good relations among indigenous 
communities and experienced land dispossession before the peace accord. The upshot of 
these results is that previous experiences of conflict combined with trust significantly impact 
on consumption preferences.  
Greater trust appears to affect household preferences about consumption. In our case, as the 
households in question are farmers, a reduction in consumption implies more saving, 
including greater investment in farming and on agricultural inputs. Moreover, the past actual 
experience of conflict is salient in this regard. In line with the arguments of Fehr and Hoff 
(2011) social institutions impact individual preferences, implying that preferences are 
endogenous to social institutions and interactions. Conflict changes the nature of social 
interactions, local institutions, and the constraints (social rules) that individuals face. The 
previous experience of conflict when combined with trust between different indigenous tribes 
appears to encourage greater saving behaviour. This is also true when the fear of future 
armed conflict is involved. Consumption, however, rises when eviction or land dispossession 
is involved. 
4.2 School enrolment 
Decisions to enrol children in school can be a proxy of investment decisions for the future, 
and because children are potentially suppliers of household labour, it entails an opportunity 
cost.  
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Table 5: Determinants of child enrolment: probit estimation 
Explanatory Variables Linear Probability 
Model 
Logit, Marginal 
Effect 
Probit, Marginal 
Effect 
Specification 1: Current perception of violence 
Fear of armed conflict -0.0039  (0.0248) -0.0065 (0.0327) -.0071 (0.0314) 
Fear of communal violence -0.01834  (0.0213) -0.0227 (0 .0278) -0.0208 (0.0268) 
Fear of eviction   0.0074   (0.0211)  0.0087 (0.0277)   0.0071 (0.0265) 
Specification 2: Previous experience of violence 
Displacement from own home -0.0066  (0.0282) -0.0075 (0.0366) -0.0073     
(0.0346) 
Land Dispossession  0.0522**  
(0.0227) 
 0.0701** 
(0.0301) 
0.0676** (0.0282) 
Past armed conflict  0.0015  (0.0218) 0.0024   (0.0283) 0.0025 (0.0271) 
  
Note: Estimation controls for variables; age of child, age square of child, sex of child, household size, 
per capita asset, age of household head, sex of household head, educational status of household 
head, type of educational institutions, language of book, and language of instruction. Social capital is 
used as control for specification 2 only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1.  
Source: authors’ estimation.  
 
Our Probit regression results of specification-1in Table 5 indicate that current perceptions of 
violence failed to explain variations in the likelihood of children’s enrolment as the 
coefficients are statistically insignificant. Although their relation is insignificant, households 
perceiving a danger of eviction have a greater chance of sending children to school compared 
to those households who do not have this perception, while apprehensions about armed 
conflict and communal violence recurring reduce the chance of child enrolment.  
 
In addition, pre-peace accord experiences of violence are found significant in the decision-
making process regarding children’s enrolment. Experience of land dispossession has a deep 
seated influence on current livelihood decision-making processes, which is evident in 
specification- 2 of Probit estimation (Table 5). It shows that households having a previous 
experience of land dispossession have a 6.7 per cent higher probability of sending children to 
school as compared to those households who did not encounter this form of violence. The 
positive and statistically significant determining role of the experience of land dispossession 
is found robust across various estimation procedures (Linear Probability Model, Logit, and 
Probit, see; annex Table 12). Pre-peace accord experiences of displacement and armed 
conflict do not separately have a significant influence on child enrolment, but both these 
variables, when accompanied with an experience of land dispossession, have a statistically 
significant relation (at 5 per cent and 10 per cent confidence level; see annex Table 13).The 
experience of land dispossession is traumatic, and creates long standing vulnerabilities, as 
land is the most productive asset. This may raise the likelihood of their sending their children 
to school, possibly with a view to overcoming the challenge of earning livelihoods from an 
ever decreasing amount of cultivable land. But the primary ‘investment’ motivation for 
schooling children is to allow future generations to acquire credentials so that they may 
escape the conflict and are less dependent on agriculture. This includes increased prospects of 
gaining formal and public sector jobs for their children (Badiuzzaman 2011). Moreover, we 
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attempted to investigate the role of trust (social capital) in the form of good relations among 
the various indigenous groups which is found to be insignificant. The interaction effect of 
past experiences of violence and social capital on probability of children’s enrolment is also 
insignificant (annex Table 14).  
4.3 Production decisions: cropping patterns 
Our regression results regarding determinants of cropping decisions are reported in Table 6. 
In the first specification, fear of communal violence has a positive role in raising the 
probability of mixed cropping (both food and cash crops), which is statistically significant 
(p<0.1). Households fearing further communal violence in future have a greater chance (14 
per cent) of growing mixed crops compared to households without such perceptions. 
Although the fear of eviction and apprehensions about armed conflict are separately 
statistically insignificant, their influence is jointly significant at a 1 per cent confidence level 
(see; annex Table 16). 
There is a possible endogeneity between fear of communal violence and cropping decisions 
because households producing mixed crops might be more apprehensive as this requires more 
fertile land in terms of location and other factors, where land is central to the conflict. We 
have used a variable describing overall satisfaction in social interactions in the community as 
a whole as an instrument since it is related to fears of future communal violence and not 
correlated to mixed cropping decisions. Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of exogeneity show that 
there is no endogeneity problem as such. We also tried Alternative Hausman tests of 
exogeneity and found the same result which implies that the coefficient of Probit model is 
preferable to the IV Probit (see; annex Tables 20-21). We also found our estimates robust 
across various models: LPM, Logit and Probit (see; annex Table 18).  
Probit results under specification-2 show that previous experiences of armed conflict 
motivated households to engage in greater mixed cropping, where the probability is about 8 
per cent higher than those households who did not have such experience (at 5 per cent 
significance). Although individually experiences of displacement from home and 
dispossession of land does not have significant influence on mixed cropping decisions, land 
dispossession along with armed conflict are jointly significant at 5 per cent confidence level 
(see; annex Table 17). In addition, we have attempted to investigate the role of social capital 
in cropping decisions. We interacted past experiences of violence and good relations among 
the indigenous communities (trust) as a proxy of social capital, but did not find these terms to 
be statistically significant (see; annex Table 15). 
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Table 6: Determinant of cropping decisions: probit and iv probit estimation 
Explanatory Variables Mixed Crop: Probit, Marginal Effect 
Specification 1: Current perception of violence 
Fear of armed conflict -0.0036  (0.0447) 
Fear of communal violence        0.1405***  (0.0408) 
Fear of eviction from own land 0.0031 (0.0432) 
Specification 2: Previous experience of violence 
Displacement from own home -0.0156 (0.0433) 
Land dispossession  -0.0532 (0.0357) 
Past armed conflict       0.0789** (0.0388) 
  
Note: Estimation controls for variables; Household size, Per capita asset, Age of household head, Sex 
of household head, Educational status of household head, Amount of cultivated land, and Type of 
cultivation techniques (jum, plough and both). Social capital is used as control for specification 2 only. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Source: authors’ estimation. 
 
Our findings are qualitatively similar to that of Nillesen and Verwimp (2010) for post-
conflict rural Burundi, where the cultivation of cash crops also increased. In our case the past 
experience of conflict and a fear of communal violence igniting in the future raise the 
probability of mixed crop production. Our apparently anomalous results, with respect to 
increasing risk-taking in cropping patterns following greater subjective feelings of violent 
experiences, can only be explained by less well known theories about risky behaviour. 
Conventional wisdom would suggest that individuals become more risk averse after an 
adverse shock, such as conflict and the fear of violence. This is also the prediction of 
expected utility theory in conjunction with the concavity property of standard utility functions 
leading to the properties of diminishing marginal utility of income, as well as absolute risk 
aversion. The standard precepts of expected utility do not, however, hold in many contexts. In 
our case, we can argue that both experience and subjective perceptions of violence amount to 
‘trauma’, which has a pecuniary counterpart that may be characterized as one where the 
concerned individual or household has sustained a financial loss. Markowitz (1952) indicated 
that starting from a state of loss, individuals are wont to engage in more risk-taking to regain 
their previous valued position, than when their wealth portfolio is exhibiting positive growth 
and their expectations are over-fulfilled. Secondly, he also pointed out that what may matter 
more for decisions to engage in risky projects is the distribution of possible profit or loss it 
may entail, rather than the absolute (expected) value of risky prospect. In other words, the 
direction of change in the household’s asset position and the possibility of regaining a highly 
valued asset in monetary or social terms are more salient than its level in our case.  
Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979) we may apply prospect theory to explain our 
empirical findings with regard to cropping patterns, bearing in mind that cash crop cultivation 
is more risky, as it does not guarantee the household’s subsistence and is more subject to 
market fluctuations. Prospect theory represents a departure from expected utility in that it is a 
two stage process, and risky ventures are weighted not just by (subjective) probability of the 
different risky states, but by a more complicated ‘decision weighting’ process. The first stage 
of the decision involves an editing phase where a reference point is chosen to evaluate the 
likely effect of the actual risky investment framed in terms of specific aspects of the highly 
valued by the decision maker. This is akin to the framing decisions currently emphasized by 
behavioural economists, and individual self-image stated much earlier by Boulding (1956).  
Following the trauma of eviction and/or violence, individuals may feel that the key value of 
assets have diminished and must be replaced as a priority. In the second stage of evaluation, 
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when the household decides on its type of crop cultivation, it may take more risks, if the risky 
project has a high enough decision weight compared to the less risky alternative. Decision 
weighting is related to the probability of an uncertain project bearing fruition, but it also 
includes the subjective desirability of the outcome, a property that alters less readily in the 
mind than the pure probability of success. The point being that taking on more risks is 
understandable if there is a substantial chance that more risky investments will lead to 
recuperation of particular erstwhile losses. This may explain why households with a greater 
past experience of violence (and in some cases a fear of future conflict) are more likely to 
invest in the more risky cash crops along with food crops.2 Moreover, prospect theory also 
suggests that the decision weight given to a desirable outcome may be greater than its 
objective probability in the expected utility framework. In other words, individuals 
overweight the likelihood of a more desirable outcome.   
Our results also have qualitatively similarities to the findings of Voors et al. (2011) in their 
field experiment in post-conflict Burundi who observe greater risk-taking and trust after 
conflict. While we only have data on trust for the survey period, and are unable to infer any 
increase in trust, social capital in the form of trust could have a possible role in determining 
livelihood decisions, which in our case is insignificant with regard to cropping choices. In our 
case, the application of prospect theory to individual decision-making by households appears 
more salient when it comes to production (cropping) decisions, as it seems better at 
explaining household risk-taking. Our earlier results about consumption, however, indicate 
that social capital is statistically relevant when interacted with actual experiences of violence. 
When individuals reduce consumption they invest more (including in agricultural 
production). Thus, trust may still influence overall investment choices even if it does not 
significantly influence its composition and risk-taking behaviour.    
5 Conclusions  
Our object has been to analyse household livelihood decision-making processes under the 
shadow of violence in the post-conflict Chittagong Hill tracts region of Bangladesh. As with 
other developing country internal conflicts, the accord ending the insurgency is imperfect in 
nature, and the central grievance concerning land encroachment is yet to be addressed. 
Violence between settlers who have encroached on the land of the ethnically distinct local 
population is still prevalent, and the Bangladesh army is still present in the region in 
substantial numbers to deal with any potential insurgency. Land, in the context of the densely 
populated and agriculturally dependent country, is the principal bone of contention. Thus, 
neo-Malthusian factors play a role in this conflict, as the shortage of land necessitates 
encroachment by settlers, which along with grievances induced by land grabbing and threats 
to the distinct way of life of the indigenous people produces conflict.  
 
The main innovation of the analysis is the incorporation of psycho-social factors, specifically 
the trauma of past violence and also current perceptions of the likelihood of future conflict 
                                                
2 Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979), let the value (V) of the household’s risky prospect be: 
.0,)()],(1[)(),(,)];()()[,()(),,,( 21 >−+−== πππππ LL yvLpxvLporyvxvLpyvLpyxV
Here v(x) is the value of the risky project; v(y) is the value of the less risky project; p refers to the probability of 
success of x, π is the decision weight which is a positive function of both the probability of success, and losses 
(L) previously sustained. It is immediately apparent that an increase in losses due to perceptions of violence will 
raise the attractiveness of the risky project by weighing the decision weight more heavily in favour of x.   
 16
into the analysis of economic decision-making. We also include some information on trust 
between the different identities that make up the indigenous group in the region. In that sense 
we endogenize preferences with regard to consumption, cropping and the decision to school 
children to these phenomena, in line with the tenets of current behavioural economics, and 
earlier work on the individual’s self image. Our research suggests that under certain 
circumstances heightened subjective perceptions about violence reigniting in the future, as 
well as past experiences of conflict, may lower consumption expenditure as a risk-reducing 
tactic while  also increasing the propensity to send children to school and risky mixed crop 
cultivation. Consumption appears to decline both with the experience of past conflict and its 
future expectation, but rises when eviction or land dispossession is involved. Previous 
experiences of land dispossession raise the propensity to school children. Past experiences of 
conflict and current fears of communal violence between the settler and indigenous 
communities increase the likelihood of more risky mixed cropping production decisions.  
 
The endogenous determination of preferences is one aspect of the explanation for the 
phenomena we are observing. It cannot by itself adequately explain greater risk-taking. We 
go on to discover that certain types of risky behaviour are best explained by prospect theory, 
which under certain circumstances predicts a certain degree of risk-taking as a response to 
loss. Conflict (experienced or anticipated) may make some people bolder and more likely to 
take risks in order to enhance their long-term future. Prospect theory is apposite in 
understanding this reaction, as people frame their decisions in the light of personal priorities 
that dominate the expected objective value of greater risk-taking.  
 
Our results do suggest the possibility of a post-conflict Phoenix or rapid economic recovery 
factor at the household level. Its presence or absence has a lot to do with individual 
household behaviour and the manner in which past experiences of violence and current 
perceptions about future conflict are processed in the mind. If they make individuals bolder 
so they aim at recovering past losses, or local institutional settings induce a preference for 
greater investment, a Phoenix factor may ensue, and rapid growth may follow. Ultimately, it 
depends on confidence, where local factors in decision-making are salient, but a lot will still 
depend on the macro political and economic framework for large-scale recovery to take 
place.  
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Appendix 1: Data and Estimation Tables 
Annex Table 1: Descriptive statistics on livelihood status by perception and experience of violence 
Perception and 
experience of 
Violence 
Decision-making: Livelihood Indicator (Mean Value) 
Consumption Expenditure (in Tk.) Investment: 
Children 
Enrollment (in %) 
Production: 
Mixed Crop 
(in %) 
All Food 
consumption 
Non-food 
Consumption 
Perception of violence 
Armed conflict 10627.15    
(3450.50) 
9964.126    
(3350.25) 
663.0242    
(335.36) 
45.48 58.19 
Communal 
violence 
11805.74    
(4240.55) 
11093.12    
(4066.36) 
712.6249    
(383.97) 
46.52 56.89 
Fear of eviction 
from land 
11890.93    
(4351.64) 
11153.32    
(4164.82) 
737.6055    
(396.17) 
46.11 57.31 
Pre-peace accord experience of violence  
Displacement 11744.86    
(4286.43) 
10989.15    
(4119.99) 
755.72    
(425.45) 
44.18 53.15 
Land 
dispossession 
11736.72    
(3859.19) 
10963.7    
(3707.27) 
773.01    
(432.25) 
48.11 50.24 
Armed conflict 11408.18    
(4198.26) 
10716.76    
(4024.87) 
691.42    
(355.88) 
43.30 54.56 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
 
Annex Table 2: Summary of variables included in regression model 
Endogenous 
Variable 
Variable Name Consumption Decision 
Equation: 
Consumption 
expenditure  
Investment 
Decision 
Equation: Child 
enrolment   
Production 
Decision Equation: 
Type of crops 
produced  
Per capita annual 
consumption 
expenditure  
lnpcyexp LHS   
Per capita annual 
food consumption 
expenditure 
lnpcyexf    
Per capita annual 
non-food 
consumption 
expenditure 
lnpcyexnf    
Child enrollment 
in primary and 
secondary school 
enroll_child  LHS  
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Type of crops 
produced 
croptype3   LHS 
Exogenous 
variables 
 
Household size hhsize √ √ √ 
Age of household 
head  
age_hhhead √ √ √ 
Sex of household 
head 
sex_hhhead √ √ √ 
HH head never 
attended school* 
edu_hhhead1 √ √ √ 
HH head 
completed 
primary school 
edu_hhhead2 √ √ √ 
HH head 
completed 
secondary School 
edu_hhhead3 √ √ √ 
HH head 
completed above 
secondary School 
edu_hhhead4 √ √ √ 
Age of child agechild  √  
Age square of 
child 
agesq_child  √  
Sex of child sexchild  √  
Government 
school  
schol_type1  √  
NGO school schol_type2  √  
Private school schol_type3  √  
Other type of 
school* 
schol_type4  √  
Language of book 
(mother 
tongue=1)  
booklanguage  √  
Medium of 
instruction in 
school (mother 
tongue=1) 
teachinglanguage  √  
Per capita HH 
asset 
pc_asset √ √  
HH electrification 
status 
hhelectrification √   
Plough 
cultivation* 
type_cultivation1   √ 
Jum cultivation type_cultivation2   √ 
Both Jum and 
plough cultivation 
type_cultivation3   √ 
Amount of land 
cultivated 
lncult_land   √ 
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Social Capital 
(trust) 
q1707 √ √ √ 
Perception of violence 
Armed conflict dq1709_4b √ √ √ 
Communal 
violence 
dq1709_5b √ √ √ 
Fear of eviction 
from land 
dq1709_11b √ √ √ 
Pre-peace accord experience of violence  
Displacement displacement √ √ √ 
Land 
dispossession 
landdispossession √ √ √ 
Armed conflict pastarmedconflict √ √ √ 
Notes: LHS indicates that a variable is included as endogenous variable in the left-hand-side of the 
equation. ‘√’ indicates that a variable is included as exogenous variable.  * Denotes reference 
category. 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
Annex Table 3: Determinant of consumption expenditure (specification1): OLS and 2SLS estimation 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable 
All consumption 
expenditure 
Food consumption expenditure Non-food consumption 
expenditure 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Household size -0.0468*** -0.0521*** -0.0432*** -0.0514*** -0.0895*** -0.957 
(0.0046) (0.0110) (0.0048) (0.0117) (0.0055) (103.0) 
Per capita 
asset 
5.61e-06*** 5.11e-06*** 5.69e-06*** 5.21e-06*** 4.10e-06*** -0.0003 
(5.32e-07) (7.49e-07) (5.41e-07) (7.71e-07) (7.43e-07) (0.0369) 
Age of 
household 
head 
-0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0011 0.0005 -0.279 
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0007) (33.23) 
Sex of 
household 
head; Male 
0.0152 0.0301 0.0190 0.0430 0.0039 -5.790 
(0.0170) (0.0357) (0.0180) (0.0394) (0.0217) (689.6) 
Educational status of household head 
Primary 
completed 
-0.0055 -0.0120 -0.0029 -0.0096 -0.0343 5.109 
(0.0196) (0.0240) (0.0204) (0.0274) (0.0242) (612.6) 
Secondary 
completed 
0.0134 0.0169 0.0138 0.0134 0.0097 -1.198 
(0.0199) (0.0291) (0.0206) (0.0317) (0.0271) (144.6) 
Above 
secondary 
-0.0639 -0.120 -0.0725 -0.163 0.0446 -3.052 
(0.0604) (0.140) (0.0632) (0.154) (0.0850) (368.6) 
Household 
electrified 
0.0137 0.0147 0.0152 0.0197 0.0169 1.836 
(0.0196) (0.0275) (0.0203) (0.0306) (0.0263) (216.8) 
Enrollment of 
children: 
Enrolled 
-0.0117 -0.0087 -0.0103 -0.0038 -0.0391** -0.757 
(0.0159) (0.0221) (0.0168) (0.0249) (0.0198) (85.33) 
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Log amount of 
cultivated land 
-0.0152** 0.0077 -0.0134* 0.0207 -0.0288*** 4.086 
(0.0072) (0.0396) (0.0075) (0.0420) (0.0098) (489.0) 
Current perception of violence 
Fear of armed 
conflict 
-0.107*** -0.593 -0.104*** -0.620 -0.128*** 68.52 
(0.0217) (0.417) (0.0224) (0.443) (0.0260) (8,204) 
Fear of 
communal 
violence 
0.0260 0.328 0.0343* 0.514 -0.0798*** -153.8 
(0.0200) (0.572) (0.0207) (0.614) (0.0258) (18,296) 
Fear of eviction 
from own land 
0.0468** -0.112 0.0458** -0.335 0.0620** -34.35 
(0.0209) (0.740) (0.0217) (0.785) (0.0267) (4,108) 
Observations 1,692 1,692 1,692 1,692 1,692 1,692 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
 
Annex Table 4: Joint test of significance (Specification 1): OLS Estimation 
 
  
 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
 
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  3,  1678) =    8.53
 ( 3)  p_evictedland = 0
 ( 2)  p_communalthreat = 0
 ( 1)  p_armedconflict = 0
. test  p_armedconflict p_communalthreat p_evictedland
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  3,  1678) =    8.06
 ( 3)  p_evictedland = 0
 ( 2)  p_communalthreat = 0
 ( 1)  p_armedconflict = 0
. test  p_armedconflict p_communalthreat p_evictedland
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  3,  1678) =   14.61
 ( 3)  p_evictedland = 0
 ( 2)  p_communalthreat = 0
 ( 1)  p_armedconflict = 0
. test  p_armedconflict p_communalthreat p_evictedland
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Annex Table 5: Alternative Hausman Test for all consumption expenditure in specification 1 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
 
  
. 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9970
                          =        1.52
                  chi2(9) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivreg
                                                                              
 lncult_land      .0076988    -.0166715        .0243703        .0388379
enroll_child     -.0087152    -.0111826        .0024674        .0151804
hhelectrif~n      .0147052     .0160621       -.0013569        .0176463
 edu_hhhead4     -.1196578    -.0647634       -.0548944        .1234914
 edu_hhhead3       .016873     .0117253        .0051477        .0197227
 edu_hhhead2     -.0120051     -.002531       -.0094741        .0135519
  sex_hhhead      .0301213     .0143283         .015793        .0311628
  age_hhhead     -.0007848    -.0004777       -.0003071        .0007344
    pc_asset      5.11e-06     5.66e-06       -5.42e-07        5.54e-07
      hhsize      -.052085    -.0462947       -.0057903        .0100828
                                                                              
                   ivols         ols         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        variables so that the coefficients are on a similar scale.
        estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your
        there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your
        of coefficients being tested (10); be sure this is what you expect, or
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (9) does not equal the number
. hausman ivols ols
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Annex Table 6: Alternative Hausman Test for food consumption in specification 1 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
 
 
  
. 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9999
                          =        1.30
                 chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivreg
                                                                              
 lncult_land        .02075    -.0134343        .0341843         .044675
enroll_child     -.0038318    -.0103144        .0064825        .0190167
hhelectrif~n      .0197068     .0151818         .004525        .0226121
 edu_hhhead4     -.1634474    -.0724941       -.0909534         .145121
 edu_hhhead3      .0134052     .0137538       -.0003486        .0248032
 edu_hhhead2     -.0096889    -.0029383       -.0067506        .0181661
  sex_hhhead      .0429912      .019012        .0239792        .0366845
  age_hhhead     -.0010595    -.0005789       -.0004806        .0008932
    pc_asset      5.21e-06     5.69e-06       -4.74e-07        6.78e-07
      hhsize     -.0514077    -.0432245       -.0081832        .0117456
p_evictedl~d     -.3350538     .0457799       -.3808337        .8483026
p_communal~t      .5135234     .0343032        .4792202        .6559354
p_armedcon~t     -.6198072    -.1038199       -.5159873        .4772124
                                                                              
                   ivols         ols         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        scaling your variables so that the coefficients are on a similar scale.
        output of your estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider
        expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the
        number of coefficients being tested (13); be sure this is what you
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (12) does not equal the
. hausman ivols ols
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Annex Table 7: Alternative Hausman Test for non-food consumption in specification 1 
 
 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
 
. 
                Prob>chi2 =      1.0000
                          =        1.13
                 chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivreg
                                                                              
 lncult_land     -.0255861    -.0287989        .0032128        .0314799
enroll_child     -.0433993    -.0390523       -.0043469        .0089563
hhelectrif~n      .0158622     .0169221       -.0010599        .0120971
 edu_hhhead4      .0580101     .0446022        .0134079         .077669
 edu_hhhead3      .0145651     .0097556        .0048095        .0146002
 edu_hhhead2      -.028767    -.0342885        .0055215        .0208098
  sex_hhhead     -.0099314     .0039469       -.0138783        .0273433
  age_hhhead      .0000894     .0004647       -.0003753        .0009558
    pc_asset      3.32e-06     4.10e-06       -7.79e-07        1.20e-06
      hhsize     -.0897747    -.0895312       -.0002435        .0073946
p_evictedl~d      .2184835     .0619637        .1565198        .3021862
p_communal~t     -.4136797    -.0798116       -.3338681        .6089152
p_armedcon~t     -.2188862    -.1281094       -.0907767        .7672077
                                                                              
                   ivols         ols         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        scaling your variables so that the coefficients are on a similar scale.
        output of your estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider
        expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the
        number of coefficients being tested (13); be sure this is what you
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (12) does not equal the
. hausman ivols ols
. estimates store ivols
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Annex Table 8: Determinant of Consumption Expenditure (Specification 2): OLS Estimation 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable 
All consumption 
expenditure 
Food consumption 
expenditure 
Non-food consumption 
expenditure 
Household size -0.0479***(0.0047) -0.0442***(0.0049) -0.0919***(0.00543) 
Per capita asset 5.50e-06***(5.42e-07) 5.55e-06***(5.49e-07) 4.27e-06***(7.48e-07) 
Age of household head -0.0005 (0.0005) -0.0006 (0.0005) 0.0005 (0.0007) 
Sex of household head; 
Male 
0.0135 (0.0172) 0.0170 (0.0183) 0.0072 (0.0218) 
Educational status of household head 
Primary completed  -0.0033 (0.0198) -0.0008 (0.0206) -0.0311(0.0243) 
Secondary completed 0.0114 (0.0200) 0.0114 (0.0207) 0.0125 (0.0268) 
Above secondary  -0.0614 (0.0579) -0.0694 (0.0604) 0.0376 (0.0858) 
Household electrified 0.0138 (0.0197) 0.0156 (0.0204) 0.0138 (0.0264) 
Enrolment of children: 
Enrolled 
-0.0105(0.0160) -0.00920(0.0168) -0.0378* (0.0198) 
Log amount of cultivated 
land 
-0.0162** (0.0072) -0.0143* (0.0075) -0.0305*** (0.0096) 
Social capital 
Good relation among 
indigenous community 
(Trust) 
-0.0197 (0.0261) -0.0180 (0.0270) -0.0452 (0.0388) 
Previous experience of violence 
Displacement from own 
home 
-0.0559**(0.0254) -0.0609**(0.0265) 0.0129 (0.0300) 
Land dispossession 0.000667 (0.0177) -0.00470(0.0184) 0.0635** (0.0258) 
Armed conflict -0.0394** (0.0178) -0.0313*(0.0184) -0.133*** (0.0253) 
Constant 9.630*** (0.0600) 9.532*** (0.0639) 7.127*** (0.0790) 
Observations 1,692 1,692 1,692 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
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Annex Table 9: Joint test of significance (Specification 2): OLS Estimation 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Prob > F =    0.0055
       F(  3,  1677) =    4.22
 ( 3)  pastarmedconflict = 0
 ( 2)  landdispossesion = 0
 ( 1)  displacement = 0
. test  displacement landdispossesion pastarmedconflict
            Prob > F =    0.0117
       F(  3,  1677) =    3.68
 ( 3)  pastarmedconflict = 0
 ( 2)  landdispossesion = 0
 ( 1)  displacement = 0
. test  displacement landdispossesion pastarmedconflict
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  3,  1677) =   11.01
 ( 3)  pastarmedconflict = 0
 ( 2)  landdispossesion = 0
 ( 1)  displacement = 0
. test  displacement landdispossesion pastarmedconflict
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Annex Table 10: Determinant of Consumption Expenditure (Specification3): OLS Estimation 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable 
All consumption 
expenditure 
Food consumption 
expenditure 
Non-food 
consumption 
expenditure 
Household size -0.0480***(0.00471) -0.0443***(0.00492) -0.0925***(0.00546) 
Per capita asset 5.50e-06***(5.41e-07) 5.56e-06***(5.48e-07) 4.27e-06***(7.48e-07) 
Age of household head -0.000529(0.000570) -0.000632(0.000592) 0.000455(0.000737) 
Sex of household head; 
Male 
0.0126(0.0172) 0.0161(0.0183) 0.00709(0.0218) 
Educational status of household head 
Primary completed  -0.00540(0.0198) -0.00325(0.0206) -0.0289 (0.0243) 
Secondary completed 0.0122(0.0200) 0.0120(0.0207) 0.0152 (0.0269) 
Above secondary  -0.0634(0.0584) -0.0718(0.0609) 0.0429 (0.0865) 
Household electrified 0.0138(0.0198) 0.0158(0.0206) 0.00998 (0.0263) 
Enrolment of children: 
Enrolled 
-0.0102(0.0160) -0.00868(0.0168) -0.0395**(0.0198) 
Log amount of cultivated 
land 
-0.0163**(0.00724) -0.0144*(0.00758) -0.0309***(0.00966) 
Social capital 
Good relation among 
indigenous community 
-0.0772**(0.0348) -0.0772**(0.0360) -0.0685(0.0504) 
Previous experience of violence 
Displacement from own 
home 
-0.0361(0.0665) -0.0332(0.0683) -0.00682(0.0952) 
Land dispossession -0.0741(0.0521) -0.0717(0.0539) -0.128(0.0927) 
Armed conflict -0.149***(0.0559) -0.157***(0.0568) -0.00779(0.0841) 
Interaction between previous experience of violence and social capital 
Displacement*Trust -0.0195(0.0714) -0.0280(0.0734) 0.0227(0.100) 
Dispossession* Trust 0.0843(0.0554) 0.0757(0.0573) 0.211**(0.0965) 
Armed conflict* Trust 0.122**(0.0590) 0.140**(0.0600) -0.137(0.0881) 
Constant 9.683***(0.0636) 9.587***(0.0671) 7.155***(0.0878) 
Observations 1,692 1,692 1,692 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
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Annex Table 11: Determinants of Child Enrolment; Specification 1 
Independent variable Regression model for Child Enrollment 
LPM Logit; marginal effect Probit; marginal effect 
Age of child 0.104***  (0.00639) 0.1355***     (0.0098) 0.1275***    (0.0089) 
Age square of child -0.00351*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0048***   (0.0005) -0.0045***  (0.0005) 
Sex of child; Male -0.0346*   (0.0199) -0.0490*       (0.0261) -0.0541**    (0.0238) 
Age of household head 0.0008     (0.0006) 0.0011          (0.0008) 0.0009         (0.0008) 
Sex of household head; Male 0.0120     (0.0185) 0.0166          (0.0243) 0.0165        (0.0232) 
Educational status of household head: no education as reference category 
Primary completed  0.0284  (0.0210) 0.0357     (0.0279) 0.0312      (0.0265) 
Secondary completed -0.0132 (0.0230) -0.0155    (-0.0299) -0.0146     (0.0287) 
Above secondary  -0.114   (0.0815) -0.1574    (0.0958) -0.1592     (0.0915) 
Type of educational institutions: other types of school as reference category 
Government School  0.104*** (0.0200) 0.1341***   (0.0257) 0.1287***     (0.0244) 
Non-government private 
school  
0.119*** (0.0262) 0.1557***   (0.0343) 0.1488***     (0.0333) 
NGO school -0.0205   (0.0595) -0.0251      (0.0728) -0.0294       (0.0703) 
Language of book; Mother 
Tongue 
0.275*    (0.141) 0.3638*     (0.1936) 0.3600**   (0.1790) 
Medium of instruction; 
Mother Tongue 
-0.309**  (0.140) -0.3574 **  (0.1499) -0.3635**  (0.1447) 
Household size 0.0027   (0.0046) 0.0034        (0.0060) 0.0031      (0.0057) 
Per capita asset 5.65e-07  (4.67e-
07) 
7.51e-07     (0.0000) 7.67e-07   (0.0000) 
Current perception of violence 
Fear of armed conflict -0.0039  (0.0248) -0.0065      (0.0327) -0.0071     (0.0314) 
Fear of communal violence -0.0183  (0.0213) -0.0227      (0.0278) -0.0208     (0.0268) 
Fear of eviction from own 
land 
0.0074  (0.0211) 0.0087      (0.0277) 0.0071      (0.0265) 
Observations 2,583 2,583 2,583 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
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Annex Table 12: Determinants of Enrolment; Specification 2 
Independent variable Regression Model for Child Enrollment 
LPM Logit; marginal effect Probit; marginal effect 
Age of child 0.104*** (0.0064) 0.1354***  (0.0098) 0.1273***   (0.0089) 
Age square of child -0.0035*** (0.0004) -0.0048***  (0.0005) -0.0045*** (0.0005) 
Sex of child; Male -0.0341*(0.0199) -0.0490*  (0.0262) -0.0537**  (0.0238) 
Age of household head 0.0008 (0.0007) 0.0011  (0.0008) 0.0009   (0.0008) 
Sex of household head; 
Male 
0.0132 (0.0186) 0.0178  (0.0244) 0.0177   (0.0233) 
Educational status of household head: no education as reference category 
Primary completed  0.0280  (0.0210) 0.0348     (0.0281) 0.0307      (0.0266) 
Secondary completed -0.0124 (0.0230) -0.0146  (0.0302) -0.0139      (0.0288) 
Above secondary  -0.116  (0.0822) -0.1599* (0.0968) -0.1605*     (0.0920) 
Type of educational institutions: other types of school as reference category 
Government School  0.103*** (0.0200) 0.1332***   (0.0258) 0.1278***  (0.02458) 
Non-government private 
school  
0.119*** (0.0262) 0.1578*** (0.0344) 0.1511*** (0.0333) 
NGO school -0.0179  (0.0593) -0.0238   (0.0735) -0.0278   (0.0708) 
Language of book; Mother 
Tongue 
0.289**  (0.140) 0.3741**  (0.1813) 0.3684** (0.1726) 
Medium of instruction; 
Mother Tongue 
-0.321** (0.139) -0.3642*** (0.1403) -0.3689***  (0.1394) 
Household size 0.00183  (0.00467) 0.0022   (0.0061) 0.0021  (0.0058) 
Per capita asset 6.58e-07  (4.67e-
07) 
8.84e-07 (0.0000) 8.80e-07  (0.0000) 
Social capital 
Good relation among 
indigenous community 
-0.0129  (0.0306) -0.0166   (0.0406) -0.0128  (0.039) 
Previous experience of violence 
Displacement from own 
home 
-0.0066  (0.0282) -0.0075 (0.0366) -0.0073      (0.0346) 
Land dispossession 0.0522**  (0.0227) 0.0701** (0.0301) 0.0676** (0.0282) 
Armed conflict 0.0015  (0.0218) 0.0024   (0.0283) 0.0025 (0.0271) 
Observations 2,583 2,583 2,583 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
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Annex Table 13: Joint Test for Significance: Specification 2; Child Enrollment 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
  
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0493
           chi2(  2) =    6.02
 ( 2)  [enroll_child]landdispossesion = 0
 ( 1)  [enroll_child]displacement = 0
. test  displacement   landdispossesion
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0553
           chi2(  2) =    5.79
 ( 2)  [enroll_child]landdispossesion = 0
 ( 1)  [enroll_child]pastarmedconflict = 0
. test   pastarmedconflict landdispossesion
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Annex Table 14: Determinants of Enrolment; Specification 3 
Independent variable Probit Model for Child Enrollment: Interaction Term 
Probit; marginal effect 
Age of child 0.1270***      (0.0089) 
Age square of child -0.0045***      (0.0049) 
Sex of child; Male -0.0539**      (0.0238) 
Age of household head 0.0009      (0.0008) 
Sex of household head; Male 0.0181       (0.0233) 
Educational status of household head: no education as reference category 
Primary completed  0.0317      (0.0267) 
Secondary completed -0.0136      (0.0288) 
Above secondary  -0.1589**      (0.0923) 
Type of educational institutions: other types of school as reference category 
Government School  0.1275***      0.0245 
Non-government private school  0.1518***      0.0333 
NGO school -0.0294       (0.0706) 
Language of book; Mother Tongue 0.3815***    (0.1752) 
Medium of instruction; Mother Tongue -0.3803**      (0.1404) 
Household size 0.0018      (0.0058) 
Per capita asset 8.80e-07      (0.0000) 
Previous experience of violence 
Displacement from own home -0.0731      (0.1148) 
Land Dispossession 0.0661      (0.0968) 
Armed conflict 0.0713      (0.1250) 
Social Capital 
Good relation among indigenous communities 0.0088      (0.0493) 
Interaction between previous experience of violence and social capital 
Displacement*Trust 0.0713      (0.1250) 
Dispossession* Trust 0.0013      (0.1002) 
Armed conflict* Trust -0.1095      (0.0837) 
Observations 2,583 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
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Annex Table 15: Determinants of production decision of mixed crop: Probit and IV Probit 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Specification 1: Perception of 
violence 
Specification 2: 
Experience of 
violence 
Specification 3: 
Interaction term 
 Probit, Marginal 
Effect 
IV Probit, Marginal 
Effect 
Probit, Marginal 
Effect 
Probit, Marginal 
Effect 
Household size 0.0048   
(0.0079) 
0.01701      
(0.0276) 
0.0042     (0.0079) 0.0048   
(0.0079) 
Per capita asset -9.93e-07  
(0.00) 
-2.21e-06      
(0.00) 
-1.26e-06     (0.00)  -1.24e-06   
(0.00) 
Age of household 
head 
0.0006   
(0.0012) 
0.0017       
(0.0029) 
0.0005     (0.0012) 0.0004   (.0012) 
Sex of household 
head; male 
-0.0288  
(0.0326) 
-0.0602      
(0.1027) 
-0.0345      (0.0326) -0.0352  
(0.0327) 
Educational status of household head; no education as reference category 
Primary completed -0.1328  
(0.1223) 
-0.2975      
(0.3761) 
-0.1503      (0.1232) -0.1477   
(0.1237) 
Secondary 
completed 
-0.1107  
(0.1265) 
-0.2317   (0.3920) -0.1291      (0.1274) -0.1288   
(0.128) 
Above secondary -0.0437 (0 
.1276) 
-0.0789   (0.3549) -0.0613     (0.1292) -0.0605  (0.129) 
Log amount of 
cultivated land 
0.216*** 
(0.017) 
0.5393***   (0.086) 0.2181***  (0.0171) 0.218*** (0.017) 
Social capital 
Good relation 
among indigenous 
community 
- -  0.0047*    (0.0504) -0.0201    
(0.063) 
Type of cultivation: plough cultivation as reference category 
Jum Cultivation 0.0731**  
(0.0334) 
0.1488   (0.1889)  0.0776      
(0.0332) 
0.0755**  
(0.0337) 
Both Plough and 
Jum Cultivation 
-0.0158  
(0.0485) 
0.0125   (0.2523) -0.0546**      
(0.0479) 
-0.0580   
(0.0482) 
Current perception of violence 
Fear of armed 
conflict 
-0.0036 
(0.0447) 
-0.1424 (0.5615) - - 
Fear of communal 
violence 
0.1405*** 
(0.041)   
0.8712 (2.0963) - - 
Fear of eviction 
from own land 
0.0031 
(0.0432) 
-0.2452 (1.0659) - - 
Previous experience of violence 
Displacement - - -0.01566 (0.0433) 0.0857  (0.1505)
Land dispossession - - -0.0532 (0.0357) -0.0679   
(0.1107) 
 
 33
Armed conflict - - 0.0789** (0.0388) -0.0677  
(0.1260) 
Interaction between previous experience of violence and social capital 
Displacement* 
Good relation  
- - - -0.1105  
(0.1637) 
Land 
dispossession* 
Good relation 
- - - 0.0161   
(0.1155) 
Armed conflict* 
Good relation 
- - - 0.1565  (0.1214)
Number of 
observations 
1,285 1,285 1,285 1,285 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
 
 
 
Annex Table 16: Joint test of significance: probit estimation for perception of violence 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex Table 17: Joint test of significance: Probit estimation for experience of violence 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
 
 
 
 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0003
           chi2(  3) =   18.95
 ( 3)  [croptype3]p_evictedland = 0
 ( 2)  [croptype3]p_communalthreat = 0
 ( 1)  [croptype3]p_armedconflict = 0
. test  p_armedconflict p_communalthreat p_evictedland
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0499
           chi2(  2) =    5.99
 ( 2)  [croptype3]pastarmedconflict = 0
 ( 1)  [croptype3]landdispossesion = 0
. test  landdispossesion pastarmedconflict
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Annex Table 18: Robustness of Probit estimation for specification 1 
Independent Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: Mixed crops 
LPM Logit Probit 
Household size 0.00445 (0.00696) 0.0217 (0.0338) 0.0123  (0.0203) 
Per capita asset -6.86e-07** (3.30e-07) -5.17e-06 (3.67e-06) -2.52e-06  (1.99e-
06) 
Age of household 
head 
0.000683 (0.000994) 0.00340  (0.00488) 0.00166  (0.00293) 
Sex of household 
head; male 
-0.0240 (0.0276) -0.145  (0.139) -0.0733  (0.0832) 
Educational status of household head; no education as reference category 
Primary completed -0.129  (0.104) -0.618  (0.491) -0.339  (0.316) 
Secondary completed -0.107 (0.106) -0.503  (0.497) -0.280  (0.319) 
Above secondary -0.0518 (0.106) -0.214  (0.502) -0.110  (0.322) 
Log amount of 
cultivated land 
0.186*** 0.932***  (0.0808) 0.548***  (0.0444) 
Type of cultivation: plough cultivation as reference category 
Jum Cultivation 0.0600** (0.0288) 0.296** (0.141) 0.185**  (0.0849) 
Both Plough and Jum 
Cultivation 
-0.0199  (0.0427) -0.0574 (0.202) -0.0402  (0.123) 
Current perception of violence 
Fear of armed conflict -0.00457  (0.0356) -0.00155  (0.188) -0.00913 (0.113) 
Fear of communal 
violence 
0.123*** (0.0364) 0.634*** (0.180) 0.362*** (0.108) 
Fear of eviction from 
own land 
-0.0115 (0.0371) -0.0547 (0.184) 0.00799 (0.110) 
Constant -0.367*** (0.132) -4.337*** (0.676) -2.576*** (0.411) 
Observations 1,285 1,285 1,285 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
 35
Annex Table 19: Robustness of Probit estimation for specification 2 
Independent Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: Mixed crops 
LPM Logit Probit 
Household size 0.00397(0.00698) 0.0187(0.0333) 0.0106(0.0201) 
Per capita asset -7.61e-07**(3.58e-07) -6.27e-06(3.88e-06) -3.19e-06(2.27e-06) 
Age of household 
head 
0.000550(0.00100) 0.00279(0.00491) 0.00125(0.00295) 
Sex of household 
head; male 
-0.0284(0.0279) -0.165(0.138) -0.0876(0.0831) 
Educational status of household head; no education as reference category 
Primary completed -0.140(0.106) -0.698(0.494) -0.384(0.319) 
Secondary completed -0.119(0.107) -0.587(0.499) -0.326(0.323) 
Above secondary -0.0614(0.108) -0.297(0.504) -0.155(0.325) 
Log amount of 
cultivated land 
0.189***(0.0120) 0.935***(0.0784) 0.553***(0.0433) 
Social capital; Good 
relation among 
indigenous community 
0.00140(0.0421) 0.0290(0.206) 0.0119(0.128) 
Type of cultivation: plough cultivation as reference category 
Jum Cultivation 0.0653**(0.0289) 0.321**(0.139) 0.197**(0.0844) 
Both Plough and Jum 
Cultivation 
-0.0492(0.0423) -0.210(0.199) -0.138(0.120) 
Previous experience of violence 
Displacement -0.00755(0.0376) -0.0686(0.183) -0.0396(0.109) 
Land dispossession -0.0409(0.0309) -0.221(0.147) -0.134(0.0901) 
Armed conflict 0.0563*(0.0331) 0.320*(0.171) 0.203**(0.101) 
Constant -0.324**(0.140) -4.041***(0.703) -2.405***(0.430) 
Observations 1,285 1,285 1,285 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
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Annex Table 20: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of exogeneity for specification-1 of ivprobit estimation 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.797905    .514445    -5.44   0.000    -3.806199   -1.789612
       resid     .6265862      .8881     0.71   0.480    -1.114058     2.36723
p_communal~t     .3594796   .1078107     3.33   0.001     .1481745    .5707846
p_evictedl~d     .0071771   .1099512     0.07   0.948    -.2083234    .2226775
p_armedcon~t    -.0122318   .1134516    -0.11   0.914    -.2345928    .2101292
type_culti~3      .131076   .2684483     0.49   0.625    -.3950729     .657225
type_culti~2      .121902   .1238976     0.98   0.325    -.1209327    .3647368
 lncult_land     .5210406   .0563678     9.24   0.000     .4105617    .6315194
 edu_hhhead3    -.0802243   .3249885    -0.25   0.805    -.7171902    .5567415
 edu_hhhead2      -.23852   .3241604    -0.74   0.462    -.8738626    .3968227
 edu_hhhead1    -.2993043   .3199099    -0.94   0.349    -.9263162    .3277077
  sex_hhhead    -.0535256   .0867454    -0.62   0.537    -.2235434    .1164921
  age_hhhead      .002225   .0030578     0.73   0.467    -.0037681    .0082182
    pc_asset    -1.41e-06   1.67e-06    -0.85   0.398    -4.69e-06    1.86e-06
      hhsize     .0267393   .0285518     0.94   0.349    -.0292211    .0826998
                                                                              
   croptype3        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood = -751.46525                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1505
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(14)   =     212.67
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       1285
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -751.46525  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -751.46525  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -751.46539  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -751.94516  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -884.60474  
> lict p_evictedland p_communalthreat  resid, robust
> ad2 edu_hhhead3 lncult_land   type_cultivation2 type_cultivation3  p_armedconf
. probit  croptype3  hhsize pc_asset age_hhhead sex_hhhead  edu_hhhead1 edu_hhhe
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Annex Table 21: Alternative Hausman test of exogeneity for specification-1 of ivprobit estimation 
Source: authors’ estimation. 
. 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9908
                          =        3.51
                 chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
         B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from ivprobit
                          b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from probit
                                                                              
p_communal~t      .3621764     .8712101       -.5090336               .
p_evictedl~d      .0079896    -.2451706        .2531602               .
p_armedcon~t      -.009132    -.1423964        .1332644               .
type_culti~3       -.04016     .0125045       -.0526645               .
type_culti~2      .1853635     .1488875         .036476               .
 lncult_land       .547792     .5393627        .0084293               .
 edu_hhhead3     -.1103845    -.0789546       -.0314299               .
 edu_hhhead2     -.2795138    -.2317209       -.0477929               .
 edu_hhhead1     -.3391165    -.2975721       -.0415444               .
  sex_hhhead     -.0733154    -.0601926       -.0131228               .
  age_hhhead      .0016594     .0017043       -.0000449        .0003563
    pc_asset     -2.52e-06    -2.21e-06       -3.05e-07               .
      hhsize      .0123259     .0170881       -.0047621               .
                                                                              
                   probit      ivprobit      Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        variables so that the coefficients are on a similar scale.
        estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your
        there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your
        of coefficients being tested (13); be sure this is what you expect, or
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (12) does not equal the number
. hausman probit ivprobit
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Appendix 2: Chittagong Hill Tracts in Map of Bangladesh (shaded area)  
 
Source: authors’ illustration. 
 
 
